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This study attempts to develop Linguistic Imperialism theory (Phillipson, 1992) and 
overcome the limitations of its historical framework through the concept of „worldliness of 
English‟ (Pennycook, 1994) and by testing it against a unique historical case. From 1840 to 
1887, the Hawaiian Islands enjoyed a constitutional monarchy with a liberal franchise 
controlled by a Native majority. This analysis of the unfolding of language policies, practices 
and beliefs under the Kingdom of Hawai„i, more specifically in judiciary and legislative 
institutions, endeavors to understand the discursive and sociopolitical process that led to the 
gradual subordination of the Hawaiian language to English before the loss of political 
sovereignty and American annexation. Special attention is given to guiding hypotheses like 
cultural hegemony and linguicism, and in order to ascertain their validity in this context, 
connections are drawn with the historical and current spread of English in post-colonial and 
non-colonial countries alike. The textual analysis of some key judicial decisions of the period 
illustrates why LI‟s positivistic assumptions on the primacy of economic factors and its 
definition of cultural hegemony don‟t stand to analysis in this case, while suggesting the 




When at Salamanca I presented the draft of this work to Your Royal Majesty, and your 
Majesty asked what use it had, the Most Reverend Bishop of Avila spoke ahead of me and in 
my stead answered: that after your Majesty put a yoke on many barbarian peoples and 
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nations of strange languages, as with their defeat these ought to receive the laws that the 
conqueror imposes on the defeated, and with them our language, then through this Craft of 
mine they could get to know it. (Nebrija, 1492)  
 The text above, excerpted from the preface to the first grammar of the Spanish language ever 
written and printed, clearly reveals what vision sprang in the minds of Queen Isabella‟s advisors 
as they first heard Antonio de Nebrija‟s oft-quoted dictum that “language always was partner to 
empire”. Their imperial project, which would immediately be put into practice in the New World 
claimed by Columbus in that same year of 1492, apparently implies the identity of political and 
linguistic power. If taken literally, their understanding would lead to the conclusion that the 
political dissolution of European colonial empires after World War II will cause the end of their 
languages‟ influence, which, especially in the case of English, has revealed to be untrue. This 
study attempts to develop Linguistic Imperialism theory (Phillipson, 1992) and overcome the 
limitations of its historical framework through the concept of „worldliness of English‟ 
(Pennycook, 1994) and by testing it against a unique historical case. This analysis of the 
unfolding of language policies, practices and beliefs under the Kingdom of Hawai„i, more 
specifically in judiciary and legislative institutions, endeavors to understand the sociopolitical 
process that led to the gradual subordination of the Hawaiian language to English before the loss 
of political sovereignty and American annexation. Special attention is given to guiding 
hypothesis like cultural hegemony and linguicism, in order to ascertain their validity in this 
context, and connections are drawn with the historical and current spread of English in post-
colonial and non-colonial countries alike. After expounding the elements of Linguistic 
Imperialism (LI), I present some of the criticism directed to it and the reasons why the 
examination of an atypical historical case may be helpful. The historical overview starts by 
laying out language policy and use, before delving into the topic of language status in the courts, 
and then the language of government and legislation. Then I offer a textual analysis of some key 
judicial decisions of the period to illustrate why LI‟s positivistic assumptions on the primacy of 
economic factors and its definition of cultural hegemony don‟t stand to analysis in this case, 
while suggesting the preliminary hypothesis of professional imperialism as a potential 
alternative. Furthermore, my account stresses the autonomy and the productive role of 
linguicism, which should be understood as a discourse on language in its own right more than a 
mere reproduction of the economic order. 
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LINGUISTIC IMPERIALISM AND ITS CRITICS 
 
The foremost question in the debate on international English can be summarized thusly: why 
do so many sovereign governments across the world, instead of promoting their own languages, 
seem to deliberately embrace English? The first significant book-length work at querying 
English as a „Language of Wider Communication‟ (The Spread of English, 1977) concluded that 
such governments freely choose English over their own languages on account of its superiority in 
furthering their commercial and political goals. In one commentator‟s words, “the world has 
opted for English, and the world knows what it wants, what will satisfy its needs” (Hindmarsh, 
1978, p. 42). This apolitical view of English language spread is objected to by Phillipson‟s theory 
of linguistic imperialism, so called by analogy with other forms of cultural, political and 
economic imperialism, which all entail asymmetrical interaction and the exploitation of one 
society or collectivity by another. To explain why English thrives more than ever after the 
collapse of the British Empire, Phillipson (1992) draws from Dependency Theory (Frank, 1966; 
Prebisch & United Nations, 1950), World Systems Analysis (The World System, 1993; 
Wallerstein, 1989, 2004), and Galtung‟s (1971, 1980, 1988) Center-Periphery framework; 
following these geoeconomic theories, he posits that the English language is serving English-
speaking powers to remain in the center of an interlocked global system of capitalism and 
perpetuate the subservient role of underdeveloped countries. Thus, he defines linguistic 
imperialism as a “dominance of English” that “is asserted and maintained by the establishment 
and continuous reconstitution of structural and cultural inequalities between English and other 
languages” (ibid., p. 47). Phillipson‟s use of the term „imperialism‟ is further justified because, in 
order to account for the origin of these asymmetrical interactions, he asserts an organic historical 
link with the colonial period of direct political control over the Periphery or Third World by the 
English-speaking Center or Core: “The progression from one type of imperialist control to 
another parallels the way power can be exerted by means of sticks (impositional force), carrots 
(bargaining), and ideas (persuasion)” (ibid., p. 53).   
To explain the persistence of imperialism and economic dependence in the Third World after 
the end of colonial rule, he resorts to the concept of cultural hegemony (Gramsci, 1971), i.e., 
dominant beliefs and values that we take for granted but actually reflect the interests of a ruling 
class or society. Thanks to their control of key sites of cultural production—especially the 
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schools and the mass media—these ruling groups would succeed at naturalizing their particular 
world view so that it wouldn‟t be taken any more as „ideology‟ specific to them but as universal 
„common-sense‟. Phillipson extends Gramscian theory beyond the borders of the nation-state to 
apply it to contacts between different linguistic communities, which are in most cases 
asymmetrical. Since “language is the primary means for communicating ideas”, it is also the 
necessary carrier of hegemonic beliefs; “therefore an increased linguistic penetration of the 
Periphery is essential for completing the move away from crude means, the sticks of colonial 
times, and even the more discreet means of the neo-colonialist phase of asymmetrical bargaining, 
to neo-neo-colonialist control by means of ideas” (1992, p. 53). In his view, language spread by 
itself can effectuate the perpetuation of colonialism, because “what is at stake when English 
spreads is not merely the substitution or displacement of one language by another but the 
imposition of new „mental structures‟ through English” (ibid, p. 166).   
This point of LI smacks of cultural and linguistic determinism and has attracted considerable 
criticism, as it suggests a mapping of monolithic cultures to languages in a one-to-one fashion. 
This stance is particularly unacceptable for poststructuralist scholars, who embrace the linguistic 
hybridity engendered in postcolonial
2
 situations and the appropriation of English. Disagreement 
with LI hasn‟t come only from the field of postcolonial cultural studies and poststructuralism 
either. At the other extreme of the academic range too, a similarly mentalist interpretation of LI 
leads scholars with a positivistic orientation to conclude that it is too powerful an account and 
therefore unscientific, as it defies empirical evidence—if cultural hegemony appears so similar to 
free choice in its form and results, how can we tell them apart? Davies (1996) summarizes that 
problematic circularity in eloquent terms:  
What if the dominated (in this case the ex-colonial anglophone countries) wanted to adopt 
English and continue to want to keep it? [Phillipson]‟s unfalsifiable answer must be that they 
don‟t, they can‟t, they‟ve been persuaded against their better interests. So what are their better 
interests? But hasn‟t [Phillipson] already indicated this: “the arguments in favour of English are 
intuitively commonsensical.” (p. 488) 
                         
2
 I use the term postcolonial (without hyphen) whenever I am pointing to particular interpretations of the colonial 
inheritance and their association with postmodernism and poststructuralism, while reserving post-colonial (with 
hyphen) to the more general and chronological sense of whatever comes after the end of direct political control over 
the colonies, including the possibility of neo-colonialism. 
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LANGUAGE AND ECONOMY: THE CHICKEN-OR-EGG DILEMMA 
 
To move the debate forward, it is necessary to remember the Marxist roots of the theory of 
cultural hegemony as defined by Gramsci, and what LI can or cannot do. LI doesn‟t preclude the 
coexistence and interaction of different cultures among communities using different languages or 
varieties of a same language, for it is more interested in how the pecking order pinned onto 
language varieties correlates with social and economic factors. This concern is most patent in 
LI‟s own terminology. In order to map the analogies between social and linguistic orders, LI 
borrows from Linguistic Human Rights theory the key concept of linguicism, which was coined 
in analogy with racism, sexism, and classism, and defined thusly: “ideologies, structures, and 
practices which are used to legitimate, effectuate, and reproduce an unequal division of power 
and resources (both material and immaterial) between groups which are defined on the basis of 
language” (Skutnabb-Kangas, 1988, p. 13). When coupled with such notion of linguicism, the 
term „cultural hegemony‟ turns out to be then a bit of a misnomer, because it may evoke the idea 
of a dominance confined to the sphere of cultural pursuits and potentially dissociated from other 
forms of hegemony. In Phillipson‟s opinion, however, promotion of English for English‟s sake 
doesn‟t happen, as it always has ulterior material goals, the best proof being the amounts of 
money devoted to it: “If language had not been perceived as a vital North-South link, the 
governments of the USA, Great Britain and France would never have invested so heavily into it 
over the past 40 years” (1997, p. 241).  
Given such strong contentions, it might then be thought that macroeconomic indicators could 
provide empirical evidence in support or against LI but, unfortunately, quantitative research is of 
little avail in ascertaining the benefits and drawbacks of embracing English. Globalization means 
that the capitalist World System that arose in Renaissance Europe now encompasses the entire 
planet and, English being an integral component to it, no alternative full-blown models of 
language policy exist for comparison. Moreover, the analysis of geoeconomic and macrosocial 
trends alone tends to disproof LI more than support it, because LI can‟t easily account for one of 
them—the increasing penetration of English among nations belonging to the indisputable 
economic Center like Japan, Germany or France, which can‟t possibly be an inheritance of 
colonial coercion, nor reflect a pattern of neocolonial exploitation, therefore negating an essential 
claim of LI. Indeed, that spread is patent not just in non-English speaking nations in the Center, 
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but throughout what Kachru (1985) calls the Expanding Circle of English, including former 
French and Spanish colonies. Phillipson (1997) has conceded this trend, but imputed it to the 
insidious effect of cultural hegemony: 
English is currently expanding in Europe in hegemonic ways, as a result of internal and 
external pressures, but in each Western European country, whether this amounts to linguistic 
imperialism is an empirical question that probably would be answered in the negative. (p. 242) 
 The foregoing remark suggests an independence between linguistic imperialism and cultural 
hegemony, which runs against LI‟s historical model and Phillipson‟s previous characterization of 
cultural hegemony as an aftereffect of colonial coercion. Actually, a possible independence of 
cultural hegemony vis-à-vis economic relations is a liability of LI if we remember that both of its 
theoretical foundations, Dependency Theory and Gramsci‟s work, are grounded in Marxist 
materialism, which considers language and other cultural phenomena essentially a byproduct of 
the socioeconomic or „material‟ base. Even in Gramscian theory, the ruling élite bases its power 
on controlling the forces of economic production; therefore, cultural hegemony would merely 
mean the conversion of economic pull into political dominance, rather than turning cultural 
dominance into other forms of power. Thus, from a (neo)Marxist perspective, cultural hegemony 
can‟t alternatively be cause and consequence, spreading English and being spread by it. On the 
other hand, Phillipson (1992) tends to represent the means to assert power (persuasion, 
bargaining, and force) as not fully differentiated: “For persuasion to work presupposes some kind 
of submissiveness, bargaining some kind of dependency, and force an element of fear” (p.272). 
In his rejoinder to Phillipson, Davies (1996) concisely reasserts the classically Marxist—or, 
better said, positivistic—view on the precedence of the economic base: “Language is indicative, 
it is not causal of social divisiveness” (p. 495). Another critic of LI also remarks that “language 
rights treat symptoms and not causes” (Brutt-Griffler, 2002a, p. 223). Even scholars in the field 
of economics conclude that “to attack English in any way is to attack the wrong target, to indulge 
in linguistic Luddism, as it were” (P. Lysandrou & Y. Lysandrou, 2003, p. 230). Incidentally, 
there is an irony here in the fact that both the staunchly anti-imperialist LI and the liberal laissez-
faire approach that criticizes it are based on the same positivistic paradigm, and both make 
similar but reversed claims on the nexus between language and economy without ever 
substantiating them. Thus, anti-LI stances that criticize the determinism of cultural hegemony but 
deny any impact of language policies on economic and social discrimination are implicitly just as 
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deterministic as LI itself, if not more.  
 
MACRO VS. MICRO 
 
An underlying cause of the determinism inherent to LI is certainly Phillipson‟s own location 
as researcher, which makes it impossible to look for agency on the part of English adopters. 
Working from the Center and on documents produced by colonial agencies and Center 
institutions, his perspective becomes “rather too impersonal and global. What is sorely missed is 
the individual, the particular” (Canagarajah, 1999a, p. 41). Pennycook (2001) remarked that 
Phillipson‟s LI lacks “a view of how English is taken up, how people use English, why people 
choose to use English […]; what he does not show is the effects of that spread in terms of what 
people do with English” (p. 62). In turn, his observer bias may be read as a methodological 
shortcoming, if compared with Pennycook‟s metaphor of the worldliness of English, a notion that 
he drew from current problems in poststructuralist literary criticism and Said‟s (1983) troubled 
plea: “Is there no way to deal with a text and its worldly circumstances fairly?” (p. 35). Like 
Said, Pennycook questions the constant and exclusive primacy of economic factors in the 
production of cultural phenomena, without ruling them out altogether either, so that the dilemma 
of balancing the relative autonomy of texts, discourses, ideas, and in general the immaterial 
cultural life of a society with their historical and material contingencies, closely parallels the 
ambiguous role of English hegemony in shaping and being shaped by the world. His notion of 
worldliness of English intends to stress that, while English is in the world, the world is embedded 
in English too, i.e., local conditions greatly contribute to global English spread. Thus, very 
localized case studies would seem the best approach to test LI, and in fact the debate around it 
has generated a flurry of empirical studies that try to use that focus. Nevertheless, most of them 
(for instance Post-Imperial English, 1996) have done little else than taking contemporary nation-
states as units of analysis in order to apply the macrosocial methods typical of mainstream 
sociolinguistics. When microsocial methods like ethnography have been resorted to (like 
Canagarajah, 1999b), they have documented many forms of resistance to Western cultural 
hegemony in English learning and use, but resistance alone doesn‟t suffice to settle the 
controversy over LI. According to Phillipson‟s definition, linguicism essentially operates through 
the characterization of languages rather than their individual speakers, and their use as social 
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markers of entire groups: “Linguicism involves representation of the dominant language, to 
which desirable characteristics are attributed, for purposes of inclusion, and the opposite for 
dominated languages, for purposes of exclusion “ (Phillipson, 1992, p. 55). In consequence, 
despite Pennycook‟s and Canagarajah‟s call to look for the local and the individual, it should 
always be born in mind that LI doesn‟t refer to individual language use but to its wider impact on 
social groups or ethnic communities, which defies the straightforward application of microsocial 
perspectives.   
In sum, it is not enough to prove that somebody has successfully „made it‟ through English, 
or has escaped cultural determinacy, because LI always requires to keep an eye on „the big 
picture‟. On the other hand, a less individualistic approach doesn‟t necessarily mean 
overestimating the modern international network of economic disparities either. Whereas the 
network effect (Grin, 2003) caused by the role of English as sole international lingua franca 
seems to accord it the greatest pull, especially in countries without a colonial past, Pennycook‟s 
notion of worldliness of English should not be taken to tautologically mean just that „English is 
the world language‟, as most people do when quoting it. Instead, as I mentioned, it encompasses 
the flip side of English being mundane, material and „worldly‟ in the sense of being deeply 
determined by local conditions, the sum of every such situation defining its global role. I want 
this sense of worldliness to problematize the seeming „otherworldliness‟ of English, i.e., the 
common perception that its dominance is decided by unknown forces or vested interests always 
lurking „out there‟, somewhere beyond the borders of nation-states and completely out of 
control. Indeed, lack of political accountability is the main problem with both pro-English 
policies and apologies for globalization. 
What a fair test of LI would look like then, and what should it focus on? As I previously 
explained, the ill-defined construct of cultural hegemony contradicts the assumed primacy of the 
economic structure without sufficient empirical or theoretical justification. Thus, cultural 
hegemony, or rather its rigid one-way historical model of organic evolution out of colonial rule, 
are clearly the weakest elements of LI, and should be reassessed. However, this weakness alone 
doesn‟t invalidate LI, for it is much more than a theory of neo-colonialism. In actuality, 
Phillipson (1992) defined linguistic imperialism as a particular form of a wider phenomenon: 
“For linguicism also to constitute linguistic imperialism presupposes that the actors in question 
are supported by an imperialist structure of exploitation of one society or collectivity by another” 
ASENSIO - LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE KINGDOM OF HAWAI‘I 
 
9 
(p. 55). Therefore, the main claim of LI goes beyond the reproduction of preexisting economic 
disparities—it hypothesizes that English may run against the collective interests of groups 
adopting it under no apparent coercion. This central contention can be empirically tested only by 
identifying what those interests were and how English and linguicism damaged them in the long 
run. Therefore, whereas ethnography and other microsocial methods are ahistorical by definition, 
a diachronic perspective suits LI research much better than a synchronic one. On the other hand, 
if taking this path, a historical approach to LI faces its own challenge—the lack of relevant 
historical cases. Instead of positing that colonial coercion can mysteriously endure after the end 
of direct political rule, it may make more sense to charge the persistence of English in post-
colonial states to the social structures inherited from the colonial period. However, if we try to 
factor out those structural legacies, and instead look for historical cases where English was 
originally adopted without political coercion, we rule out the entire Outer Circle and are left 
without possible precursors of the contemporary English language spread in the Expanding 
Circle, where adoption of English started only after World War II at the earliest, therefore lacking 
the necessary historical depth to judge its long-term impact. And it is precisely in breaking this 




Located in the strategic heart of the North Pacific, the Hawaiian islands are since 1959 an 
integral part of the United States of America, and the indigenous language has been driven away 
from common use by English. Although current efforts at revitalization have arrested the 
complete shift to English monolingualism (Kahumoku, 2000; Lucas, 2000; Makaʻai, Shintani Jr., 
Cabral, & K. K. Wilson, 1998; Warner, 1999; W. H. Wilson, 1998a, 1998b), at the nadir of its 
decline in 1983 the Hawaiian language was everyday language to only a single community of 
less than 200 people on the tiny island of Niʻihau. The other islands harbored less than 2000 
fluent speakers, all above the age of 60, with a number of other members of the community 
merely having a passive command (Kimura, 1985). In comparison, the estimated population of 
the islands at the time of the first visit by Western sailors in 1778 ranges from 300,000 to 
800,000 inhabitants (Stannard, 1989) all of which spoke Hawaiian. Against overly deterministic 
historians that only see in Hawai„i a sad but inevitable example of survival-of-the-fittest, some 





 scholars (Kameʻeleihiwa, 1992; Osorio, 2002; Silva, 2004; Trask, 1993) have 
started a revisionist reading of the historical record in order to query the myth of Native
4
 
nonresistance to foreign encroachment. One of the most interesting aspects of this 
reinterpretation is the new emphasis on the many ways in which Hawai„i, rather than being yet 
one more episode of colonial dispossession of indigenous nations, compounds an unusual case 
that doesn‟t neatly fit in the general picture of Western expansion by sheer military violence. 
Mainstream historians (Daws, 1968; A. G. Day, 1955; Fuchs, 1961; Kuykendall, 1938a) have 
systematically understated the fact that from 1840 to 1893 Hawai„i was a sovereign nation whose 
independence was recognized by the United States, France, Great Britain, Japan, and other great 
powers of the time. Furthermore, it commanded such respect because it was a stable 
constitutional monarchy based on ethnic and religious pluralism, state-funded universal 
education, popular representation and a very liberal franchise, in a time when these virtues were 
uncommon even in the West. A bill of rights was proclaimed in 1839, and the following year the 
first written constitution ensued. Starting in 1845, a series of organic acts established a full-
fledged constitutional monarchy, with a bicameral Legislature and separation of executive, 
legislative, and judiciary powers. In 1851, membership in the House of Representatives was 
enlarged and made elective, and the first national election was held with universal male suffrage. 
In 1887, a group of haole
5
 conspirators backed by the sugar planters forced a new constitution at 
gunpoint that granted them almost exclusive political power. This coup d‟état paved the way for 
the final overthrow of the Native monarchy in 1893, when an oligarchic Republic was 
established while waiting for annexation to the U.S., which finally occurred in 1900. 
                         
3
 Kanaka maoli (kānaka maoli in plural): in Hawaiian language, literally, „original/genuine person‟. I have preferred 
to use this endonym without italics because it was the common term in 19
th
 century Hawaiian and has been 
relaunched by contemporary indigenous scholarship, whereas other categories like Native Hawaiian have been 
traditionally imposed and defined from without. „Kanaka maoli‟ deemphasizes the racial requirements of U.S. 
mandated blood quanta, instead stressing  linguistic and genealogical connectedness with the land. On the other side, 
I use the term „Hawaiian‟ in its widest sense when it may be applied to any citizen or denizen of the Kingdom of 
Hawai„i regardless of ancestry. 
4
 Native: I capitalize this term to make it stand in opposition to Western, whenever it can be applied to other 
indigenous nations beyond Hawai„i, or alternating it with „kanaka maoli‟ as an attribute. 
5
 Haole: “White person, American, Englishman, Caucasian; American, English; formerly, any foreigner; foreign, 
introduced, of foreign origin” (Pukui, 1986, p. 58). I use this term not with its current racial overtones, nor as an 
equivalent to the U.S. notion of „White Anglo-Saxon Protestant‟. Instead, I take it to mean English-speaking 
Caucasian, given that traditionally it always excluded non-English speaking groups like the Portuguese, Spaniards, 
and Puerto-Ricans. Note, however, that national ancestry or native-speaker status are not necessary features, for 
many French, Belgians, Germans and Scandinavians assimilated to the Anglo-Saxon community and were therefore 
categorized as haole. 
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Although since 1851 any foreign-born denizen was allowed to vote and stand for office after 
one year of residence, it can‟t be easily argued that the kānaka maoli never had the slightest 
control over their political institutions. Despite the property qualifications introduced by the 
1864 constitution—$500 and $150 in real estate for candidates and voters respectively—kānaka 
maoli still made up the majority of the electorate for most ballots in the monarchic period and 
even later, by virtue of the haole-dictated Bayonet Constitution that from 1887 on 
disenfranchised all people of Asian descent. In that year‟s special election, the qualification of 
$3000 in real estate required to vote for the House of Nobles restricted kanaka maoli registration 
for that chamber to 35.5% against a 40.4% of British and American vote combined, but kānaka 
maoli still made up 64% of voter registration for the House of Representatives (Schmitt, 1971, p. 
55). Also, whereas most constitutions were written by foreign advisors and patterned after 
foreign models, the longest lasting one, from 1864 to 1887, was drafted by a Native king and 
granted him veto power over the Legislature. Finally, the seven-year delay between the 
overthrow of the last Queen and the annexation to the U.S. further suggests that external 
aggression had a lesser role in the loss of sovereignty and language, regardless of how colonialist 
and racist the conspirators‟ mindset and goals were. Instead, the loss was enabled by the internal 
political workings of a modern, democratic, multi-ethnic state, while also being related to 
processes of international trade and economic globalization that were already on their way (see 
Wallerstein, 1989, 2004). Subordination through economic ties instead of military might, for 
instance, became patent after the 1875 Reciprocity Treaty with the U.S., which tied the Kingdom 
to the American market, but it was already present before, in its reliance on foreign aid donors. 
Thus, in 1836 the ruling chiefs sent a memorial to their benefactors in Boston as contemporary 
developing governments would. New England philanthropists were requested to send teachers 
“like the teachers who dwell in your own country” just like they had sent missionaries, ranging 
from carpenters, masons, and paper makers to “a teacher of the chiefs in what pertains to the 
land, according to the practice of enlightened countries” (Bingham, 1849, p. 496).  
From a linguistic perspective, pre-colonial Hawai„i makes for a unique case because English 
language hegemony preceded the loss of Native political control by several decades. That 
atypical adoption of English is nowhere more patent that in its educational system. The Kingdom 
pioneered a specific feature of modern secular governments—state-funded compulsory 
education. Universal school attendance was enforced since 1840, and by the middle of the 19
th
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century the Kingdom of Hawai„i enjoyed one of the most wide-reaching school systems in the 
world. In his Report to the Legislature for the year 1853, the Minister of Public Instruction could 
boast that the literacy rate of Hawaiʻi already outstripped many of the United States. 
Nevertheless, in 1854 the Legislature, with a majority of kanaka maoli legislators, passed a law 
to use public funds in subsidizing English language schools specifically created for kanaka maoli 
children. As time went, the combined weight of subsidized and private English language schools 
slowly but steadily drove out public schools taught in Hawaiian. One year before the 1893 
overthrow, there were just 28 Hawaiian-medium schools left, enrolling 552 students. Compared 
with the combined enrollment in governmental English schools and private schools, this figure 
means that a mere 5.2% of school-age children were receiving instruction in Hawaiian. The shift 
to English preceded the Bayonet Constitution of 1887 and the loss of kanaka maoli control over 
the government as well, for in 1886 the percentage was down to 22.5% already. Overall, in 
monarchic Hawai„i we face the unparalleled case of a country that, without being a colony, 
switched its entire public education system to what had originally been but a foreign language 
spoken only by a tiny minority. This anomaly understandably baffled even conservative 
historians like Wist (1940): “In one respect the process of change was most unusual in the history 
of education; for there was absent one factor, generally required elsewhere when a nation has 
changed the language of its common schools, namely, the force of political dominance” (p. 73).   
Wist‟s point doesn‟t seem unwarranted if interpreting “political dominance” merely as 
explicit coercion. When looking specifically for school-related language legislation, the first 
instance of mandated language use can‟t be found until after the overthrow, in Act 57 of June 8th, 
1896. With this Act, the oligarchic government of the new Republic of Hawai„i made English 
“the medium and basis of instruction in all public and private schools” (Civil Laws of the 
Hawaiian Islands §123, 1897). In practice, the Act completely prevented any school, even self-
supporting ones, from operating full-time in any language but English. And yet, by the time Act 
57 went into effect, there were only three schools left that taught in Hawaiian, enrolling just 59 
students, or 0.5% of the school population (Report, 1896). 
 
DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
 
Most attempts at explaining the foregoing paradox are on the line that “as English became 
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the dominant language of the Islands‟ commercial and political environments, school policy 
mirrored the changing domestic tides” (Kahumoku, 2000, p. 127), which despite being 
intuitively sound still dodges some tough questions: (a) what was the specific nature of that 
dominance; (b) how it originated and spread throughout Hawaiian society; (c) how it relates with 
other forms of domination, it it relates at all; and, most significantly, (d) why it prevailed against 
likely opposition from the kānaka maoli. On this last point we step on contested terrain though, 
because from an early stage in the shift to English we find claims by the top educational 
authorities that “the popular demand is for English” (Report, 1878, p. 4) or “the desire of parents 
that their children may be instructed in the English language continues unabated” (Report, 1876, 
p. 15). Some opponents to contemporary kanaka maoli activism therefore claim that “the parents 
recognized that the path to social and economic success would be through English” (Conklin, 
n.d.) but this, again, is a rationalization after the fact—why weren‟t enough opportunities 
available through the Hawaiian language? Kanaka maoli scholars rejoin that statements made by 
haole that were themselves involved in the switch to English aren‟t to be taken at face value, for 
they are blatantly biased whereas the beliefs of the kānaka maoli “were probably diverse” (Silva, 
2004, p. 145), although establishing what those beliefs were is a hard matter. Day (1985) 
downplays the differences between the Kingdom of Hawai„i and Guam—which was a colonial 
dominion through its entire history and oftentimes under direct military rule—and labels both 
cases as „linguistic genocide‟; nevertheless, he too remarks the aforementioned paradox with 
perplexity: “Whether the English speaking foreigners could have killed Hawaiian alone, without 
help from the Hawaiians themselves, is an open question with no conclusive answer” (p. 170). 
And yet, this is exactly the kind of question that LI was posed to address. 
After the foregoing discussion it should be clear why Hawai„i stands out against the backdrop 
of 19
th
 century Western imperialism, and becomes relevant to our current concerns about 
globalization, English language spread, language endangerment, cultural sovereignty, 
educational inequalities, and the future of our increasingly multi-ethnic, interdependent polities. 
While in other settings the adoption of English is shrouded in colonial coercion, in Hawai„i that 
process lays open to our inquiry, without the structural impact of either diachronic factors—the 
colonial inheritance—or synchronic conditions—the network effect caused by the current global 
status of English. In sum, Hawai„i affords a unique chance to, not just testing the validity of LI, 
but also looking for the proto-colonial in the pre-colonial. There we may find, in reverse—from 
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sovereignty to colonization—an early example of trends that would come to the fore only after 
the onset of decolonization, and, more uniquely, we may be able to analyze their full 
development down to (hopefully one of) their possible outcomes. This paper endeavors, thus, to 
understand the roots of the process that led to the complete substitution of English for the 
Hawaiian language in the Kingdom of Hawai„i.  
Whereas the shift of the school system from Hawaiian to English is the most intriguing 
aspect of English hegemony in Hawai„i as I noted above, for space reasons this paper will 
confine itself to a related topic of study—the legal status of English and Hawaiian throughout 
this period, and their respective standing within the judiciary system of the Kingdom. On the 
other hand, the complexities of educational policies and practices cannot be understood without 
first charting the „changing domestic tides‟ that impacted on them. Also, there are other reasons 
to focus specifically on the ties between language and law. Firstly, law is the social activity 
where language carries its greatest authority, so that it makes sense to take it as a benchmark of 
linguistic penetration. Secondly, legal status is also important in ascertaining to what degree 
language use was coerced, and how the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi was at variance with typical 
colonies in that respect. Thirdly, the legal domain is often the structure that restrains and 
channels educational policies and practices, not just by explicitly mandating what can or has to 
be done, but also indirectly, through the absence of explicit policies, or through the language in 
which policies are spelled out. 
 
HAWAIIAN AND THE COURTS 
 
Legislative evidence suggests that from the very beginning the main policy on language was 
actually a lack of explicit policy. Whereas that might be unsurprising in a monolingual nation, 
the fact is that post-Contact Hawai„i wasn‟t such a country any longer. In 1853, the first reliable 
census registered, besides 70,036 pure Hawaiians and 983 part Hawaiians, 2,119 resident 
foreigners. Of these, 291 were born in Hawaiʻi—mostly to American missionary families—and 
therefore subjects of the Kingdom. Among foreign born residents, the greater part were 692 
United States citizens, followed by 435 British subjects if including those born in Canada and 
Australasia (Polynesian, April 22
nd
, 1854). These numbers tell of a growing English-speaking 
community with rights comparable to those of indigenous subjects, either by birth or denization, 
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and therefore of a de facto multinational state. However, the laissez-faire approach and the ad 
hoc practices that took root during the establishment of a constitutional monarchy never openly 
addressed this diversity. Instead, they subordinated language use to the national appropriation of 
foreign expertise, which ultimately would favor foreigners.  
In 1852, a bill to prevent people without at least a passive command of Hawaiian from being 
appointed circuit and district judges was turned down by the House of Nobles, with the argument 
that “as persons possessing skill in the law, good character and knowledge of the language, were 
scarce to be found,—the House preferred a man who had the two former, to him who had the 
latter qualification alone” (Weekly Argus, 1852, June 2nd). The decision wasn‟t based on pure 
efficiency alone, as the discussion of the bill in the House of Representatives had made clear the 
“great inconvenience” resulting from the judges‟ inability to communicate. The Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, George M. Robertson, although a haole, “thought it natural that the 
natives should complain of not being understood” and acknowledged them “naturally entitled to 
demand that the man who judged them, should be able to examine them himself and give his 
own sentences without the often equivocal assistance of an Interpreter”. He also asserted that 
being “a thorough-bred lawyer” was “not … a necessary prerequisite in order to be a good 
Judge” (Weekly Argus, 1852, May 12th). Robertson spoke from his own experience—in 1850 he 
had been made Circuit Judge for the island of Hawaiʻi despite being just a former whaler with no 
special training, probably on account of his moderate command of Hawaiian (Dyke, 2008, pp. 
83-4). Yet, the Upper House seemingly favored the contrary view opposing the “manifest 
injustice” of discriminating naturalized foreigners in spite of their skills and loyalty to the 
Kingdom. When in 1859 the Civil Code (§1065) standardized the bar examination as well, being 
a naturalized subject and the Supreme Court‟s license became the only requirements to practice 
law in the Kingdom, with no mention made of language prerequisites.  
In practice, and despite the failure of the 1852 bill, many appointments to judicial offices 
apparently tried to reconcile the needs and rights of both kānaka maoli and haole. Thus, in 1855 
Kamehameha IV appointed Robertson an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, in substitution 
of another bilingual judge, the former missionary Rev. Lorrin Andrews. That a covert policy of 
bilingualism was in force is made clearer by the appointment of Robertson‟s colleague in the 
Supreme Court, John Papa ʻĪʻī. His contemporary Kamakau (1992, p. 248) confirms that he was 
one of the first kanaka maoli to learn English, at the first Mission school established in Honolulu 
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in 1820; moreover, from 1840 he had an unusual chance to widen his English skills on being 
appointed kahu (babysitter/attendant/tutor) to the royal children boarding at the Chiefs‟ Children 
School, an institution created by the Kingdom to have the children learn English from missionary 
teachers (Menton, 1982). In many aspects, this unofficial bilingualism continued for decades but, 
of course, as the House of Nobles predicted it was difficult to find competent bilinguals, so that 
very soon bilingualism was concentrated and professionalized in a few bureaucratic positions, 
becoming a feature of the institution at large rather than individual. Starting in 1860, each 
Legislature assigned an appropriation for an interpreter attached to the Supreme Court, whose 
salary overshadowed that of most district judges. Arrangements like this worked in the first 
decades because the judiciary system tended to minimize contact between kānaka maoli and 
haole in the courts. For instance, since the original institution of juries in Hawaiʻi by the Law for 
the Regulation of Courts (1842), all jurors were selected matching the defendant‟s race, so that 
only in civil suits with parties of different race they had to be mixed in even parts. In 1859, the 
Civil Code (§1188, §1197) further specified that naturalized foreigners and people “of foreign 
parentage” were to be considered haole in jury composition. Also, the Act to Organize the 
Judiciary Department of 1847 created a separate class of „police courts‟ to have jurisdiction over 
cases involving foreigners, leaving the rest for the district courts.  
Nevertheless, occasional corrections to this unofficial bilingualism hint that from the very 
beginning it tended to drift towards increasing English monolingualism. For instance, by 1859, 
the practice of sending indictments in English was so prevalent that the Civil Code had to entitle 
defendants to receive a translation to Hawaiian “on demand upon the district attorney” (§1173). 
Despite this early sign, it seems that the bilingual setup remained relatively stable until at least 
1876. By then, Hawaiian language ability in district courts, which were at the forefront of the 
judiciary‟s dealings with the public, may have declined so much that requests to translate 
indictments now had to be elevated to the general attorney in Honolulu instead (Sess. Laws 
1876, p. 105, §44). To address the problem, that same year it was finally enacted that foreigners 
appointed to district judges had to be “proficient in the Hawaiian language” (Sess. Laws 1876, p. 
23). This rule came twenty years too late and, at any rate, enforcement was probably difficult, so 
that by 1890 the Supreme Court interpreter—whose salary was now second only to the Justices 
themselves—was servicing circuit and police courts alike. At this time, a separate appropriation 
existed as well for interpreters at “all courts not specially provided for” (Sess. Laws 1890, p. 89-
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91), before the Legislature eventually gave up on enforcing language prerequisites and 
authorized that appropriation by statute (Sess. Laws 1892, p. 3). Similar troubles plagued the 
publication of the Supreme Court‟s decisions in Hawaiian, which was discontinued after 1881 
(Lucas, 2000, p. 22). In 1890 the need of translating this growing body of local case law proved 
so urgent that the Legislature had to issue an act to “expressly” provide for that (Sess. Laws 
1890, p. 110). It seems that the key challenge was finding a qualified and willing full-time 
translator, despite the promise of a generous salary—up to $10,000, i.e., matching that of any of 
the associate justices appointed to the Supreme Court. Apparently, nothing of this ever came to 
fruition.  
From the picture just sketched one might conclude that the dominance of English in the 
courts ensued, like in the case of Hawaiian schools, not from coercion but from the unregulated 
competition between English- and Hawaiian-speaking practitioners of law. Yet, against any resort 
to free choice theories or disingenuous claims of survival-of-the-fittest, LI would instead charge 
the demise of bilingualism to a structural factor—the foreign origin of Hawaiian law. The first 
two trained lawyers to arrive to Hawai„i—John Ricord in 1844 and William L. Lee in 1846—
created almost singlehandedly the entire juridical framework of the Kingdom and left an 
indelible mark on it. Both were Americans, which caused the tacit adoption of the American 
legal system. In 1855 G. M. Chase, U.S. consul at Lāhainā, in a public address to the Royal 
Hawaiian Agricultural Society pointed out that origin to his haole audience. In his view, the 
establishment of an American legal framework in itself heralded the impending demise of 
Hawaiian language and the annexation of the islands to the U.S: 
Already its language and principles of Law and Government have sought these Islands, and 
indeed are planted here. Its language is employed as the medium of legislative mandates and of 
judicial construction and authority. Its use is becoming familiar, if not necessary to all the organs 
of power, and in all the transactions of important business affairs. Having got such permanency, 
will this language die? Rather will it daily increase in its influence and use, and finally control 
the destinies of this people? It most certainly must, and those who ignore it will sink under its 
extending power. (Sandwich Islands Monthly, 1856, March, vol. I, 3, p. 70) 
Chase‟s divinations have to be considered in the context of failed U.S. negotiations to annex 
the Kingdom in 1854, and be taken as a continuation of ongoing psychological warfare more 
than an accurate depiction of the linguistic situation in his time. And yet, as we know, his 
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prophecy came true. Walter F. Frear (1894), appointed Associate Justice of the Supreme Court by 
the oligarchic Republic of Hawai„i right after the overthrow of the Kingdom, saw a similar 
predestination in the history of Hawaiian law, but he was more precise as for the ultimate cause: 
The adoption of the common law by our courts ever since they began to adopt any foreign 
law is significant of the early and continued predominance here of the Anglo-Saxon civilization 
as distinguished from that of Continental-European nations who have for the most part followed 
the Roman law. (p. 19)   
Both historical and current facts validate the correlation proposed by Frear. The path taken by 
Hawai„i sharply diverged from the one later followed by Japan and many other non-Western 
nations, which instead opted for the selective adoption and translation of legal codes derived 
from Roman civil law as it has evolved in continental Europe.  From the beginning, Hawai„i‟s 
legal system was the Anglo-American common law in all but the name—it borrowed the 
institution of the jury, a separate jurisdiction of equity, and most importantly, the judges‟ 
prerogative of making law not just through judicial review but also by the force of binding 
precedents. In civil law jurisdictions, on the other hand, judges are only allowed to apply the 
statutes enacted by the legislative branch, with judicial precedent having a much more limited 
authority. The nexus between language and legal system is therefore that, at common law, all the 
immense body of case law recorded and handed down in English since the English Revolution is 
potentially binding and just as important as statutory law. A like example is Islamic law, which 
grants to case law a similar authority so that it is inseparable from the Arabic language. In 
consequence, wherever common law is adopted, being able to read and quote British law 
reports—and often reports from the U.S. and other common-law jurisdictions as well—is a 
necessity to practice law, if not an express requirement to be admitted to the bar. Since nowadays 
practically all former British colonies including the U.S. retain the common law system, while 
other non-Western jurisdictions use either civil codes or Islamic law, it is undeniable that 
common law is one of the strongest reasons for the persistence of English as an official language 
in post-colonial states. In arguing this, I am not comparing the relative hegemony of English and 
French in their respective colonies, which would lead to the conclusion that the difference of 
common and civil law is irrelevant on this score. Instead, we have to look at non-colonial nations 
as I did above—Turkey, Iran, China, Japan—where Westernization and the free adoption of civil 
codes has been compatible with the use of the national languages in the courts. On the other 
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hand, the few nations that adopted British common law without direct colonial coercion later 
either dropped it altogether—Thailand, Israel—or, like the case of Hawai„i, have evolved to 
pervasive English language use. Another evidence pointing to the identity of common law and 
the English language is Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay‟s infamous Minute of February 2nd, 
1835, which is often called „the Manifesto of English education in India‟ and lays at the root of 
English language spread beyond the British Isles. There, the colonial officer remarked that link 
himself and proposed to exploit it. Interestingly, whereas in 1492 the bishop of Avila advocated 
the imposition of Spanish to better enforce the laws of Castile, Lord Macaulay reversed the terms 
and put law reform at the service of language spread:  
The fact that the Hindoo law is to be learned chiefly from Sanscrit books, and the 
Mahometan law from Arabic books, has been much insisted on, but seems not to bear at all on 
the question. We are commanded by Parliament to ascertain and digest the laws of India.  [ … ] I 
hope and trust that, before the boys who are now entering at the Mudrassa and the Sanscrit 
College have completed their studies, this great work will be finished. It would be manifestly 
absurd to educate the rising generation with a view to a state of things which we mean to alter 
before they reach manhood.  
The Minute makes clear that Macaulay‟s goal of persuading the British East India Company 
to substitute English for Sanskrit, Persian and Arabic in the institutions of higher education that it 
subsidized—which he achieved (see Krishnaswamy, 2006; Viswanathan, 1989)—was only one 
part in his grand scheme. Two years later, in 1837, English was made the sole language of Indian 
law courts, spurring the demand for a clerical class of bilingual Natives—so-called „Macaulay‟s 
children‟. Lord Macaulay devoted himself to his overarching plan in the following decades and 
drafted a common-law based Penal Code, which in 1860 would be enacted in India and later on 
across the entire British Empire, nowadays being still used in most former British colonies, from 
India to Nigeria and Malaysia. As for the judiciary system itself, still now judges in those 
countries routinely quote pre- and post-independence British and American law reports alike, 
without the reverse usually happening. It is then essential to realize that the British colonial 
heritage in this area is not a mere historical memory but an ongoing form of dependence.  
The most intriguing aspect of the establishment of common law in Hawai„i is that, like the 
dominance of English, it was never expressly enacted. William Lee‟s Act to Organize the 
Judiciary Department (1847) put common law and Roman or civil law on equal footing as 
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auxiliary foreign sources of jurisprudence for the courts (ch. I, §2-3). The incorporation of 
common law was never official—it was recognized among other supplementary sources of 
jurisprudence only “so far as the same may be founded in justice, and not in conflict with the 
laws and customs of this kingdom” (Civil Code §823, 1859). Interestingly, the unofficial nature 
of common law prevalence actually bestowed on the judiciary branch an even greater freedom of 
maneuver and more legislative power than that enjoyed in typical common-law jurisdictions. 
Thus, during the Anglophile reigns of Kamehameha IV and V (1855 to 1872), when foreigners 
were resorting to common law loopholes to evade prosecution, the Supreme Court asserted its 
independence from foreign precedent by, for instance, allowing a kanaka maoli widow to sue an 
American captain for wrongful death, whereas neither common law nor the statutes of the 
Kingdom provided for that (Kake v. Horton, 2 Haw. 212, 1860). Nevertheless, as time went the 
selective application of common law paradoxically hardened its prestige and furthered the 
entrenchment of “the laws of those countries, to whose authority and opinions we yield the 
highest veneration” (Kake v. Horton), so that by 1891 it was found that of the 900 cases reported 
to the Supreme Court in over 40 years, in only 9 (1%) the Court departed from common-law 
jurisprudence (Thurston v. Allen, 8 Haw. 399) and then only when repealed by statute in other 
common-law jurisdictions. It is therefore understandable that, in 1892, the Supreme Court could 
squarely endorse the dominance of English by arguing that “of necessity the English language 
must be largely employed to record transactions of the government in its various branches, 
because the very ideas and principles adopted by the government come from countries where the 
English language is in use” (In re Ross, 8 Haw. 480, 1892). This was a surprising remark to make 
after two recent rulings (King v. Robertson, 6 Haw. 725, 1889; Thurston v. Allen, 8 Haw. 399, 
1892) where the same Court had cogently insisted on its independence from common law, to the 
point of stressing that Hawaiʻi was “not an English colony” (King v. Robertson). In truth, no 
reception statute had ever officially incorporated common law into the juridical fabric of the 
Kingdom, but in November 1892, just two months short of Queen Liliʻuokalani‟s overthrow, the 
Act to Reorganize the Judiciary Department took care of that: from now on, for all civil matters 
“the common law of England, as ascertained by English and American decisions” was to be “the 
common law of the Hawaiian Islands” (Sess. Laws 1892, p. 91, §5) dropping all provisions for 
non-English legal traditions. The reception of common law was made palatable to kanaka maoli 
legislators perhaps because, besides limiting the judges‟ power to legislate, it included an 
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exception for “Hawaiian national usage” that seemed to accommodate traditional customary law, 
although in fact a Supreme Court ruling had abolished it decades before as I will show later. 
 
HAWAIIAN AND THE LAW 
 
The foregoing account of the encroachment of English into Hawaiian law courts has been 
streamlined for convenience and may sound more deterministic than intended. Certainly more 
factors than just the unofficial adoption of common law contributed to it, and there was nothing 
intrinsically irresistible in English ascendancy. It should be born in mind that the monolingualism 
of common law, for instance, is itself an outcome of deliberate British policies like the 
Proceedings in Courts of Justice Act of 1730, which obliterated the traditional English-French-
Latin trilingualism of British courts. As for Hawai„i, the structural workings of the state didn‟t 
predetermine the adoption of English language and common law in the courts, as judiciary and 
legislative powers were barely separated at first. From Ricord‟s departure in 1847 to the arrival 
of Charles C. Harris in 1850, William Lee was the only person in the Kingdom with a common-
law education, and for over a decade the number of residents with formal training in Western law 
could be counted with the fingers in one hand. Given that scarcity, any expertise had to be spread 
throughout the state machine so that legislators doubled as judges, or vice versa. Justices Lee, 
Robertson and ʻĪʻī all served terms in the Legislature while holding seats at the Supreme Court, 
and it was only in 1859 that the Civil Code (§818) disqualified any judge from the Supreme 
Court down to circuit courts to stand for office in the House of Representatives. Moreover, 
before the establishment of a bar examination and official licensing procedures in 1859, 
legislative experience was regarded as sufficient qualification to be appointed judge or practice 
law. According to Osorio (1996), since the very first legislature “a term as Representative very 
often prefigured appointment to judicial office” (p. 145). One third of all representatives 
appointed until 1851 succeeded their terms with a seat on the bench, and of the 24 
representatives elected in 1851, by 1855 14 of them, kānaka maoli and haole alike, were acting 
as judges or attorneys. Given this trend in the courts, where former legislators applied the law 
that they themselves had previously enacted, one would expect the strengthening of Hawaiian 
statutory law over English case law. Also, the former had the potential to grow at the expense of 
the latter through codification. Judge Lee in fact followed this course in 1850 when compiling 
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the Penal Code. According to his own Preface he based it on “the principles of the English 
common law, as the foundation of a code best adapted to the present and approaching wants and 
condition of the nation” rather than “the ancient laws and usages of the kingdom” (p. iv). 
However detrimental his choice was to the recognition of Hawaiian customary law, his approach 
opened an avenue to assimilate and translate common law. At least in theory, it was possible for 
Hawaiian legislators to counter the penetration of English in law courts. Whereas the 
unacknowledged adoption of common law was a structural constraint favoring English, the 
agency of particular influential individuals like Justice Lee had the potential to bend it. Thus, the 
intimate connection between the English language and the juridical system of the Kingdom was 
not what prevented legislators from systematically codifying English case law into statutory law, 
which would have turned it into a civil law system in the national language, as it was done much 
later in countries like Israel or Thailand, or to a lesser extent in Malaysia (Mead, 1988)⁠. To 
understand why Hawaiian law didn‟t develop in that direction, it is advisable to take a look at 
coetaneous events in the field of statutory legislation.  
The first written laws in Hawaiʻi were originally promulgated in Hawaiian and later 
translated to English. In the preface of the so-called Blue Book (1842), the first English language 
compilation of Hawaiian law, the anonymous translator took responsibility of all variances from 
the original and specified that “the original, of course, will be the basis of all judicial 
proceedings”. Things changed with Ricord‟s arrival and the governmental reorganization that he 
ushered in 1845. The historian Kuykendall (1938b) commented that from this point on it is 
patent that the English version was the original one, for “the quaint language of the early laws 
gave place to a more elaborate, precise, and formal phraseology” (p. 228). Nevertheless, a 
stronger influence of foreign models didn‟t immediately entail that the Hawaiian version lost its 
binding force. Ricord‟s second Organic Act (Act to Organize the Executive Departments, 1847) 
mandated that all laws be published simultaneously in Hawaiian and English in the official 
governmental newspapers, thus establishing the tacit bilingualism of government and legislation. 
As time went, unsolvable conflicts were found between the English and Hawaiian versions of 
laws. The first solution tried was to have the Legislature enact all amendments on either version 
on a case-by-case basis. This practice changed after the 1856 ruling Metcalf v. Kahai (1 Haw. 
402, 404), wherein the Supreme Court resolved that the Hawaiian version of the Penal Code be 
held governing. Just five months later in Hardy v. Ruggles (1 Haw. 467, 463) the new preference 
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was extended to any statute “because it is the language of the legislators of the country” despite 
all parties in the suit being haole. The turning point came with the 1858 decision Haalelea v. 
Montgomery (2 Haw. 62, 69) whereby the Court dictated that the English version of all deeds of 
conveyance was to be held original and binding regardless of the grantor‟s mother tongue. Thus, 
although the kanaka maoli plaintiff obtained redress from the haole defendant, Haalelea v. 
Montgomery paradoxically invited to the dispossession of kānaka maoli from their lands, 
because now the courts held them accountable for mistranslations. 
Given that all decisions by the Court were published in the governmental newspaper The 
Polynesian, it is undeniable that they influenced public opinion among the haole community. The 
new mistrust on the accuracy of Hawaiian language caught like wildfire across the legislative 
corpus. One year after Haalelea v. Montgomery, the Civil Code, drafted by the judges of the 
Supreme Court and enacted by the Legislature, specified that the governing version for any part 
thereof was to be the English one (§1493); it also dispensed with explicit bilingual enactment of 
laws, leaving the details of their publication at the discretion of the Minister of Interior (§ 2). 
Although the governmental newspaper in Hawaiian continued publishing all new laws, an act of 
1865 generalized the new preference for the English version to “any of the laws of the Kingdom, 
which have been, or may hereafter be enacted” (Sess. Laws 1865, p. 68). As time went, 
relegating Hawaiian to a secondary legal status took a toll on the language. After the 
discrepancies between versions of the law were noticed in the 1850‟s, the Legislatures took steps 
to prevent them, but in a direction that severely forestalled the development of an autonomous 
law making practice and of original legal concepts in Hawaiian. Thus, in the Preface to the 
Compiled Laws of 1884, Judge McCully declared to be the main author, having delegated to his 
kanaka maoli colleague Judge Kapena only the task of “prepar[ing] the Hawaiian version from 
the proof sheets of the English” because “in no other way could there be secured an exact 
conformity of the two versions” (p. iv). Thus emerged a vast body of legal texts in Hawaiian with 
complex phraseology, but holding very little authority, and legal developments never parted 
away from Anglo-American juridical practice. 
By 1880, the shadow that the English-speaking judiciary system cast onto Hawaiian 
education became explicit as well. The bleak state of Hawaiian in the courts and in other 
domains became an excuse to coax Representatives into curtailing support for instruction in the 
language. Limiting language use in practice rather than by statute, it set the stage for further 
ASENSIO - LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE KINGDOM OF HAWAI‘I 
 
24 
decline. In the 1879 session of the House of Representatives, after the Educational Committee 
criticized the Board of Education for trying “the gradual supplanting of the Hawaiian”, Charles 
Bishop, the president of the Board, conceded that “as long as their mother tongue continues the 
language chiefly used in the intercourse, business and courts of the Kingdom, they [Hawaiians] 
should be taught also to read and write this correctly” (Report, 1880, p. 5). As Hawaiian retreated 
in the courts, Bishop‟s successor, the self-proclaimed pro-Native Walter Murray Gibson, was 
now justifying the neglect of common schools with the contention that “the English may be said 
to be the prevailing language of this kingdom, legally and industrially. The decisions of the 
highest tribunals of the land are in English” (Report, 1886, p. 4).  
In the last decade of the Kingdom, political events aggravated the sidelining of the Hawaiian 
language. In 1887, a militia of haole businessmen and members of the parliamentary opposition 
party rose in arms and coerced King Kalākaua into signing a new constitution of their own 
making. Among many other changes, the Bayonet Constitution extended the official use of 
English specifying that the literacy requirements to qualify for vote and to run for member of 
either House of the Legislature could be satisfied through Hawaiian, English, “or some other 
European language” (Arts. 59, 61 & 62). In fact, literacy requirements for voters had started with 
the 1864 constitution (Art. 62), and it might be said that the new law only made official the 
already practiced bilingualism. Nevertheless, an unspoken consequence of upgrading English to 
parity with Hawaiian was that the Hawaiian language, which had been the default language, was 
tacitly downgraded whenever no incontrovertible mention was made to it, as the courts would 
soon declare. In 1892 the Supreme Court declined a petition to annul that year‟s election for the 
House of Nobles in Oʻahu, rejecting the claimants‟ argument that the Hawaiian version of the 
ballot couldn‟t be an incomplete abridgment of the English one. Chief Justice Albert F. Judd 
rejoined that no law or statute explicitly required bilingual ballots, so that “the printing of the 
ballots in English was a compliance with the law, as would also be the printing of them in 
Hawaiian, or in both said languages” (In re Ross, 8 Haw. 478, 1892). This pretense of equality in 
practice only told the petitioners, mostly members of the anti-annexationist Liberal Party in the 
opposition (Kuykendall, 1938a, pp. 516-7), that the availability of laws and ballots in Hawaiian 
language was just a courtesy from the government more than a right, again making kānaka maoli 
liable for any discrepancy with the English originals. Thus, it eventually became clear to 
Hawaiian language speakers what had happened in 1859—laws in Hawaiian didn‟t protect their 
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rights any longer, but were a trap instead. As for Justice Judd‟s sense of fairness, it was served by 
the mere possibility of initiating legal action in either language: “The records of our courts show 
pleadings of all kinds in the Hawaiian language received with as much approval as those in the 
English. Which language would be used would depend upon the comparative familiarity of the 
writer with one or the other” (ibid., p. 480).  
The review of the status of Hawaiian as a language of law suggests that, without a 
comprehensive study of judicial and legislative records, any sense of a slow quantitative shift in 
the monarchic period may be quite subjective. Even in the courts, and in spite of Gibson‟s 
claims, it is difficult to accept that language use changed so rapidly since Bishop‟s remarks eight 
years earlier either. As I pointed above, the use of interpreters and the prevalence of English in 
Supreme Court rulings were features of the judiciary system since its establishment, rather than 
signs of decadence. As for the legislative power, Mark Twain (1966) provides an eyewitness 
account of professional interpretation in the 1866 Legislature, and specifies that even a legislator 
like Prince Kalākaua, who was “an accomplished English scholar”, preferred to speak in 
Hawaiian (p. 111). In fact, Hawaiian language would continue to be used significantly in both 
judiciary and legislative functions well after the overthrow of the Kingdom. It was only with the 
Annexation Act of 1900, instituting the government of the new Territory of Hawai„i, that jurors 
“who cannot understandingly speak, read, and write the English language” (§83) were 
disqualified, which made English the exclusive de facto language of the courts. A similar 
persistence can be found in legislative proceedings; whereas the Annexation Act (§44) mandated 
that they be conducted in English, kānaka maoli members of the first Territorial legislature could 
so disregard that rule that in the first years both Houses still had to hire interpreters (Kloss, 
1998). The publishing of laws in Hawaiian too was discontinued as late as 1943 (Sess. Laws 
1943, p. 1). To the political persistence of Hawaiian Reinecke (1988) bears witness about 1935 
writing that, still then, “a candidate‟s chances of being elected are stronger if he can make a good 
campaign speech in Hawaiian, and twenty years ago it was practically necessary for him to be 
able to do so” (p. 141).  
Such evidence argues that the issue at stake was not actual language use as much as the legal 
and even ontological status of the Hawaiian language itself, which was settled relatively early in 
the landmark cases of the 1850‟s that justified awarding English the role of governing language. 
The qualitative sea change that these decisions signal make it possible to disagree with Day 
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(1985), who can‟t identify any decisive event in the decline of Hawaiian: “There is no one 
turning point, no one piece of legislation, no royal decree that we can point and say with 
confidence that it marked the time when Hawaiian lost to English” (p. 168). My own take is that 
Hawaiian didn‟t immediately „lose‟ to English in 1858, because the impact of Haalelea v. 
Montgomery might have been reversed very quickly just as it had reversed Metcalf v. Kahai, but 
it wasn‟t, so that its accumulated effects over the years did eventually become irreversible. The 
farther we look after that watershed the more important structural constraints turn, and the less 
sense it makes talking about individual language choices. 
 
LANGUAGE POLICY VS. THE LANGUAGE OF POLICY 
 
If language status was what truly mattered, it is time to turn back to the hypothesis of 
linguicism. Phillipson (1992) uses Galtung‟s theory of power to refine it into three categories of 
arguments for English: (a) “what English is” or English-intrinsic arguments, i.e., its innate 
qualities and capacities over other languages; (b) “what English has” or English-extrinsic 
arguments, which refers to the resources it conveys; and (c) “what English does” or English-
functional arguments, meaning the structural power of English and its use as an exclusionary 
gate-keeping requirement. Of course, the qualities of English are relative to other languages, so 
that whatever is predicated about English casts a negative counterpart on competing languages, 
and vice versa. If looking at Hawai„i‟s case, it seems that precisely English-intrinsic arguments 
were paramount, as an essential superiority of English was established in linguistic terms that 
legitimated its structural power within the legal framework. While Hardy v. Ruggles et al. still 
declared Hawaiian the governing language of Hawaiian law, Chief Justice William L. Lee 
conceded to Judge Lorrin Andrews‟ testimony that the Hawaiian words disputed by the 
defendants were “broad and indefinite in their meaning, having no corresponding word in the 
English language, but, on the contrary, as being capable of answering to a hundred different 
words in the English language” (p. 462). It would have been difficult for Lee to do otherwise; 
Judge Andrews hadn‟t just been his colleague in the Supreme Court as an associate judge until 
the previous year. A secularized missionary, Andrews had been the first principal of Lāhaināluna 
Seminary, the first institution of higher learning in Hawai„i, where kānaka maoli were trained in 
Hawaiian for the ministry and other offices in the government. Also, he was one of the 
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translators of the Bible into Hawaiian, and author of the first Hawaiian-English dictionary ever 
printed. His testimony as an „expert‟, which in practice meant that Hawaiian lacked a word for 
„mortgage‟, was the first attack on the capacity of Hawaiian to be a language of law, on account 
of its purported vagueness. It is worth mentioning that, whereas the defendants claimed 
Hawaiian to be too polysemous, they also exaggerated the preciseness of the English language, 
so that Justice Lee had to resort to dictionaries of legal terms to contradict that „pledge‟ couldn‟t 
include the meaning of „mortgage‟ as well as „bailment‟. 
The same haole attorneys who took part in Hardy v. Ruggles et al. continued the linguistic 
controversy in Haalelea v. Montgomery. The defendant‟s counsel quoted Rev. Andrews‟ 
testimony in the previous case to contend that the Hawaiian wording of a bilingual deed of 
conveyance was vaguer than its English version, and “broad” enough to grant the defendant 
exclusive rights over fishing grounds off his property, against the kanaka maoli plaintiff. Justice 
George M. Robertson agreed on the question of ambiguity: “there do not exist in the Hawaiian 
language two words which would exactly represent the two English words „tenements and 
hereditaments‟” (p. 69)—presumably because they had been translated with the composite 
phrase “na mea e pili pono ana” instead of two distinct words in one-to-one equivalence to 
English. However, instead of caving in to the defendant´s claim the judge arrived to a contrary 
conclusion: since property law terms as used in English formulas of conveyance “could not be 
expressed in Hawaiian without great difficulty”, the Hawaiian version was “merely a translation” 
and the English version was to be original and binding for any deed from then on. It is worth 
noting that Robertson‟s preoccupation on the greater antiquity of English legalistic formulae over 
the Hawaiian ones wasn‟t asked for, but it was his own initiative, for he conceded to the 
plaintiff‟s counsel that the contended Hawaiian phrase was “accepted by the general consent of 
natives and foreigners using such formula, as meaning precisely the same things, and neither 
more or less than those two legal terms”, without nevertheless agreeing with him that both 
versions of the deed formed but one instrument. The judge was therefore going off his way and 
overruling an established consent in the name of linguistic niceties, although in doing so he 
followed the lead of the defendant‟s attorney, who had brought up the problematic phrase while 
the contented point was the unrelated definition of appurtenances. In this way, the Court 
sanctioned into law what I may call a genealogical axiom, i.e. the assumption that concepts, and 
especially legal ones, cannot be truly expressed and understood but in the language where they 
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were first worded out. This belief has been called the „folk-Worfianism‟ of American linguistic 
culture (Mertz, 1982; Nunberg, 1992), surfacing for instance in the 1923 Meyer v. Nebraska 
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, which opposed “foreign tongues and ideals” to English and 
“American ideals”; in Hawai„i too the same assumption appears in the later judicial decision In 
re Ross, which identifies the English language with the “ideas and principles adopted by the 
government”. This axiom would be put to practice in 1897 by the Constitution of the Republic of 
Hawai„i, which required applicants for naturalization to “be able intelligently to explain, in his 
own words, in the English language, the general meaning and intent of any article or articles of 
this Constitution” (Art. 18). In this respect, Hawai„i pioneered the twelve states where nowadays 
voter literacy requirements conveniently confound literacy, English language ability, knowledge 
of Legalese, and good citizenship. It is now clear then that, under such genealogical belief, 
codifying and translating English common law into Hawaiian necessarily made little sense. 
Then again, it would have been impossible for Robertson to write off Hawaiian legal terms if 
their chronological subordination couldn‟t be justified by the novelty of the concepts behind 
them. It wasn‟t a matter of words as much as the legal practices that they represented, because it 
was agreed that inheritable and saleable land ownership didn‟t have precedents in Hawaiian 
tradition. Before contact with the West, the mōʻī or sovereign of each island, as a representative 
of the gods, held the right to dispose of all lands and grant their lifelong use in trust to konohiki 
(landlords or land stewards), who in turn received rent from the hoaʻāina (tenants or, more 
literally, „land partners‟) in the form of produce or free labor certain days every month. At the 
death of each konohiki the right to use the land reverted back to the mōʻī rather than to any heir 
designated by the konohiki. When the mōʻī himself passed away, his successor held a kālaiʻāina 
or „land carving‟ and redistributed lands to the new generation of konohiki in return for personal 
loyalty or military services, or in other cases according to genealogical primacy. Grants of land 
to be held in perpetuity in a particular lineage were extremely uncommon before the reign of 
Kamehameha I (Kameʻeleihiwa, 1992). However, for Westerners precisely the rights to 
bequeath, mortgage and sell were the only land use rights that mattered, and their lack was 
tantamount to the much despised feudalism of old Europe. Thus, in 1848 the King‟s foreign 
advisors persuaded him to institute Western-style alienable land ownership by dividing between 
him and 251 konohiki the Kingdom‟s lands that under the 1840 Constitution they had held in 
common, in the legal revolution known as Māhele („division‟, but also „sharing‟). Also, in 1850 
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the legislature entitled the hoaʻāina to apply for fee-simple ownership of their kuleana, the small 
homesteading lots that they inhabited and cultivated for themselves. All foreign settlers 
congratulated themselves, like for instance the Minister of Public Instruction, R. Armstrong: 
“This gives the final blow to the old odious feudal system, & makes this a nation of free holders” 
(quoted in Kuykendall, 1938b, p. 292). To better understand his words, it is necessary to remark 
that traditional Hawaiian society was stratified into a minority of aliʻi (aristocrats, chiefs) and a 
majority of makaʻāinana (commoners), with the latter doing the bulk of economic activity, 
particularly agriculture. Rank was rigorously determined by ancestry, and among the aliʻi 
themselves higher or lower status was recognized according to their genealogies, which were 
traced back to the gods. All haole, but more insistently the Americans, invariably assimilated the 
makaʻāinana to the exploited peasantry of ancient-regime Europe and the aliʻi to feudal nobility, 
qualifying the entire system of “complete despotism” (Jarves, 1847, p. 33). Of course, this 
representation required to overlook the many differences—the economic setup excluded 
inheritable land ownership, and the aliʻi weren‟t a military élite as much as a ritual caste; the 
makaʻāinana, in turn, owned their labor and weren‟t bound to the land like European serfs. 
Armstrong‟s words make it clear that the haole didn‟t deem Hawaiian culture just different, 
but backwards, and lagging behind on a lineal path to progress and civilization—an assumption 
that, on the other hand, a simple look at slavery in the U.S. should have contradicted. The 
characterization of Hawaiian land tenure as „feudal‟ neatly exemplifies what scholars of 
colonialism like McClintock  (1995) call the trope of anachronistic space—a representation that 
portrays colonized societies “not as socially or geographically different […] and thus equally 
valid, but as temporally different and thus as irrevocably superannuated by history” (p. 40). It is 
then terribly ironic that both terms „tenements‟ and „hereditaments‟ arose in Middle Age France 
and originally encoded concepts of European feudalism. Even „fee-simple‟ land titles—the 
buzzword that animated haole agitation leading to the Māhele—were originally „fief-simple‟. 
Paradoxically then, while foreign observers projected onto traditional Hawaiian society that 
“wicked system of land monopoly” (Jarves, 1847, p. 233), its very same terms were proclaimed 
to be lacking in the Hawaiian language. In sum, a society with communal land management was 
forced to adopt a legal framework that bore the indelible imprint of feudalism in its very core, 
precisely under the charge of being itself too feudal. Both tropes—genealogical primacy and 
anachronistic space—had to be coupled in a cohesive discourse in order to lock Hawaiian culture 
ASENSIO - LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE KINGDOM OF HAWAI‘I 
 
30 
into an obsolete, unchanging past. On the other hand, Robertson‟s contention that the English 
version of the disputed formula be held original could easily be challenged on mere 
chronological grounds. In fact, the phrase „tenements and hereditaments‟ originated from 
Norman French in a time when pleading in English wasn‟t allowed in British courts. The word 
order in the phrase „fee simple‟ betrays a French origin too. Thus, a true prototype of all deeds of 
conveyance, if such existed, would have to be sought in French or Latin rather than English. 
Nevertheless, Robertson‟s decisions inhabit a discourse where the historical view of a lineal 
development in civilization paralleled an essentialist concept of language. For him, „tenements 
and hereditaments‟ had to encode two different concepts, since they were expressed in distinct 
words. Little he knew that they were synonyms reflecting the trilingualism of pre-modern British 
courts, when lawyers avoided ambiguity by pairing foreign legal terms with their Anglosaxon 
translation (see Crystal, 2004).  Thus, the formula here discussed takes on a very trivial meaning 
if we consider it a short for the English-French-Latin triplet „lands, tenements and 
hereditaments‟.  
At any rate, it is doubtful that etymology alone would have impressed Robertson, because 
Saussure‟s ideas on the arbitrariness and variability of linguistic signs laid 50 years in the future. 
He and his contemporaries lived in the paradigm of perfect languages so well described by Eco 
(1997), a world view of words and ideas in one-to-one correspondence, inherited not only from 
the biblical account of Genesis but also from Plato‟s idealism. In actuality, this view of language, 
combining folk-Worfianism and universalism, is a general feature of ethnocentrism and still 
prevails in popular opinion, the alternative of structural linguistics being confined to scholarly 
circles. This was also the case in the 19
th
 century, for linguistic relativism and the materialist 
critique of language universals had been around since the works by Herder and the French 
Idéologues. Given the nearly divine unity of word and world in lay minds, the 19
th
 century 
teleological view of language change as „natural‟ evolutionary growth, and the ensuing distrust 
towards deliberate language planning as well, it makes sense that anachronistic space and 
genealogical primacy combined to oppose that Hawaiian language and culture be able to borrow 
foreign words and practices, or adapt them in a Native way—instead, both had to be wholly 
replaced. A telling example of this belief is another decision by Robertson, only nine months 
after Haalelea v. Montgomery. This time he ruled that the claim of a hoaʻāina right to pasture 
horses in dry grass konohiki lands was “so unreasonable, so uncertain, and so repugnant to the 
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spirit of the present laws, that it ought not to be sustained by judicial authority” (Oni v. Meek, 2 
Haw. 90, 1858). He reasoned that, as horses were a Western introduction, the practice didn‟t meet 
the requisite of being a custom from „time immemorial‟—another common-law phrase with 
French word order. The ruling resulted from the new doctrine of English language primacy that 
translated the Hawaiian word „pono‟ on the disputed lease as the common-law concept of 
„customary right‟, yet it also betrays the tendency of fixing Hawaiian culture into a fossilized 
past, and crippling its capacity to evolve. With his museumizing approach, Robertson claimed 
the power to define Hawaiian traditional law, and therefore to abolish it. 
Robertson‟s misgivings on the ambiguity of Hawaiian legal terms stand in sharp contrast 
with his readiness to redefine English words by pure judicial fiat. Just as he proclaimed the 
nonexistence of land tenure terms in Hawaiian and the governing primacy of English, he went on 
to retroactively colonize the semantic space open by the devaluation of Hawaiian language; after 
quoting pre-Māhele laws of 1839 and 1846, the judge reclaimed for English a word that 
undoubtedly translated the Native term „hoaʻāina‟: “We understand the word tenant, as used in 
this connection, to have lost its ancient restricted meaning, and to be almost synonymous, at the 
present time, with the word occupant, or occupier” (Haalelea v. Montgomery, 71). This 
momentous decision granted any local resident the same fishing rights enjoyed by tenants before 
the Māhele, which at first seemed fair enough, putting haole newcomers and kānaka maoli on 
equal footing. Nevertheless, it became the precedent invoked in Oni v. Meek to deprive both 
kuleana holders and hoaʻāina alike of all land use rights not expressly mentioned in statutes. Oni 
v. Meek seriously compromised the economic viability of the kuleana, because their small size—
averaging 3 acres each (Kameʻeleihiwa, 1992, p. 297)—made their holders still dependent on 
konohiki lands for irrigation, gathering, pasturage, and subsistence in general, which was now 
greatly restricted. Far worse was however the ruling‟s effect on the hoaʻāina that hadn‟t filed any 
land claim by the May 1854 deadline (Sess. Laws 1853, p. 26). By that date, as many as 70% of 
all eligible households (Kelly, 1980, p. 66) might have failed to secure title to their land for 
manifold reasons, including fear of losing access to konohiki lands. Oni v. Meek not only 
confirmed their suspicions—the new definition of hoaʻāina also made them landless squatters 
overnight. Equating hoaʻāina rights with those of kuleana holders to the lowest common 
denominator, the Court refused to recognize that the two systems of land tenure, now renamed 
“old” and “new”, actually existed side by side. The ruling did away not just with Hawaiian 
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customary rights, but also with communal land use. Now the introduced „system of land 
monopoly‟ held sway over the entire Kingdom.  
 
HEGEMONY AND ITS LIMITS 
 
The foregoing analysis, gleaned from textual data, makes a good case for linguicism: given 
the consequences of making English the governing language, kānaka maoli were actually 
“persuaded against their better interests”, as Davies would put it. Moreover, we now have not 
only evidence of the escalating long-term effects of Robertson‟s decisions, but also an instance—
Oni v. Meek—of almost immediate detrimental impact on kanaka maoli interests. This effect on 
the economic base agrees with Phillipson‟s definition that linguicism be able to not just 
„legitimate‟ and „reproduce‟ preexisting inequalities but also „effectuate‟ them. On the other 
hand, there is little evidence of other necessary conditions for linguistic imperialism, most 
notably the promotion and adoption of the English language. In actuality, the entire juridical 
debate revolved around the terminological primacy of English, whereas actual use of Hawaiian 
in the courts and the legislature apparently changed little for the next two decades. With language 
penetration absent, cultural hegemony seems out of the picture as well. Indeed, Hawaiian history 
doesn‟t support that a „control by means of ideas‟ or a replacement of „mental structures‟ requires 
language penetration in the Periphery, at least if this is taken to mean actual language learning. 
The very enactment of the Māhele manifests that the infiltration of „hegemonic beliefs‟ preceded 
both widespread English teaching and the privileging of English in the judiciary, and, moreover, 
it was inoculated through Hawaiian language instead of English. In 1838, after the government‟s 
efforts to secure New England teachers failed, Rev. William Richards was offered a salary as 
royal “chaplain, teacher, and translator” (Kuykendall, 1938b, p. 154). He was the first of a string 
of missionaries that would sever their ties with the Mission to work under the Hawaiian 
monarchs. As part of his duties, Richards started to translate the book Elements of Political 
Economy, by Francis Wayland, a zealous advocate of free trade and governmental non-
intervention in economics. For one year, he used the book to lecture King Kauikeauoli and other 
aliʻi nui (high chiefs) every morning on the principles of government of “enlightened nations”. 
So says Richard himself:  
The Conversation frequently took so wide a range that there was abundant opportunity to 
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refer to any and every fault of the present system of government… When the faults of the present 
system were pointed out & the chiefs felt them & then [they] pressed me with the question, 
“Pehea la e pono ai [How shall we be pono (righteous/fair/balanced)]?” (quoted in 
Kameʻeleihiwa, 1992, p. 176)  
In 1840, the Mission published Richards‟ abridged translation with the title No Ke Kālaiʻāina 
(On Political Economy); in it, much stress was placed on the idea that in “enlightened nations” 
the sale and acquisition of land was the main source of wealth. According to Menton (1982), if 
reading the book, “the exact connections between Wayland‟s ideas and political and economic 
developments in Hawai„i may become clearer” (p. 47). Here then we have a blatant case of what 
we could only call cultural hegemony that nevertheless didn‟t require English language 
penetration. The same would go for the Christian religion, if we are to consider it another form of 
cultural hegemony. 
 
AT THE ROOT OF POWER 
 
The picture laid out thus far greatly complicates the theory of LI, for it gives a detailed 
example of the problematic circularity that I previously alluded to: if linguicism may be both a 
precursor and an aftereffect of colonialism, indistinctly generating and reproducing inequalities, 
then the origin of power cannot be located in the material base any longer but instead becomes 
what must be explained, whereas the nexus between language hegemony and economic 
dominance remains elusive. It is undeniable that the justices of the Supreme Court who decided 
these cases were also instrumental in bringing about the land revolution. Kameʻeleihiwa (1992) 
pronounced Justice Lee “an excellent example of the evil duplicity” of self-declared Hawaiian-
loving foreigners (p. 298), for he masterminded the 1850 law that granted foreigners the right to 
own land, with the alleged goal of attracting foreign investment. It is also true that they, like 
other haole members of the government, greatly benefited from the Māhele that they instigated, 
quickly becoming a landed capitalist élite. In fact, it would be difficult to find any haole in 
Hawai„i who didn‟t profit from the Māhele in the short or long run, given that they started from 
restricted access to the land—by the royal proclamation of June 19th, 1841, foreign-born haole 
were only entitled to leases of up to 50 years (Kuykendall, 1938b, p. 275). Finally, it is manifest 
that the process of linguistic subordination of the kānaka maoli began with Haalelea v. 
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Montgomery when their economic subordination through land dispossession was already under 
way, and that both immediately converged in Oni v. Meek. And yet, the time span is too short and 
the evidence too tenuous to defend that one caused another. It makes more sense to propose that 
both processes arose independently but stemmed from a common third force.  
A question closely related to power and linguistic imperialism is how the Supreme Court was 
allowed to demote the Hawaiian language, and especially why John Papa ʻĪʻī, the kanaka maoli 
Associate Judge, assented to Haalelea v. Montgomery. That he did is indisputable, since all three 
judges—Lee, Robertson and ʻĪʻī—heard the suit together. Galtung‟s model certainly allows to 
interpret ʻĪʻī‟s role in the light of his social status and knowledge of English, which would make 
him a typical case of élite bilingualism. This becomes clearer when reviewing ʻĪʻī‟s political 
career. Originally from a kaukau (low ranking) aliʻi family barely above the level of 
kamaʻāinana, he had been trained to serve the aliʻi nui as a kahu for their children. I have already 
remarked his exceptional access to English, which allowed him to rise to prominence. As his 
ability to deal with foreigners in their language increased, so did his meteoric ascent. In 1852, at 
the peak of his career, besides an Associate Justice of the Superior Court he was a member of the 
King‟s Privy Council and of the House of Nobles, which he represented in the drafting of that 
year‟s constitution. He also was one of the five Commissioners to Quiet Land Titles, who were in 
charge of ascertaining and validating all land claims by private individuals in preparation for the 
Māhele. Furthermore, there is evidence that the missionaries in the government favored the 
promotion of bilingual aliʻi, often overriding strict genealogical ranking. A well known case is in 
1842 the appointment of Keoni Ana to the governorship of Maui over a rival that had a much 
more exalted pedigree. According to kanaka maoli historian and eyewitness Kamakau (1992):  
William Richards argued for John Young [Keoni Ana] because he understood a little English 
and since there were many whale ships and other foreign boats calling at Maui he would make a 
better escort for the King and represent him better before the officers of the battleships and with 
delegates from foreign lands. (p. 397) 
Later on, Keoni Ana would rise to become member and president of the King‟s Privy Council 
and also his kuhina nui (premier/viceroy), a dignity only lower to that of the King himself. Given 
the power thus gained through English, did an élite of bilingual aliʻi become a Center in the 
Periphery as LI would predict? Did they sell out the political, economic and cultural interests of 
their subjects in exchange for renewed dominance over them? Day‟s (1985) opinion points in 
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that direction: “The English-speaking foreigners were aided and abetted in their efforts by the 
Hawaiian elite” (p. 168). Testing that hypothesis would require a deep look into aliʻi education 
and political activity, which goes beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, three remarks should 
suffice. First, the rise of ʻĪʻī‟ and Keoni Ana intimate that English knowledge prevailed over rank 
precisely because it was an exceptional skill among the aliʻi, and in any case two men don‟t 
make a social class. Secondly, the primacy of English didn‟t benefit bilingual kānaka maoli as 
much as the monolingual haole that vied with them for appointments and clients, especially after 
Oni v. Meek obliterated customary law making Hawaiian language proficiency still less relevant 
in the courts. Thirdly, whatever ʻĪʻī‟s intentions were, the kanaka maoli representatives and 
nobles that reviewed and enacted the Civil Code in the 1859 Legislature without striking down 
Section 1493 didn‟t understand that the change in language status was „defining groups on the 
basis of language‟ in order to establish an unequal division of power.  
One important reason that the legislators couldn‟t imagine the long-term impact of Section 
1493 may have been that the groups so defined on the basis of language didn‟t exist as 
identifiable interest groups but came into being thanks to linguicism itself. Not unlike John ʻĪʻī 
and Keoni Ana, all ex-missionaries in the government‟s payroll owed their clout to their 
bilingualism, Rev. William Richards being a paradigmatic example. So was the case of Rev. 
Lorrin Andrews as well, who was appointed judge in 1845 after leaving the Mission in 1842, 
despite lacking any formal training in law. We have already seen that a layman like judge 
Robertson too owed his career to his command of Hawaiian. Outside of the judiciary, a similar 
case was also Rev. Richard Armstrong, who succeeded Rev. Richards in the Ministry of Public 
Instruction. We should then be wary of immediately making them all representatives of a 
monolithic haole community, because their monopoly over the government could be maintained 
just as well, if not better, by preserving the status quo of unofficial bilingualism. In fact, neither 
ethnicity nor bilingualism sufficed to build common interests over individual ambitions. Thus, 
Robertson started his career in 1848 when, being a clerk for Minister of Interior Gerrit Judd, he 
achieved publicity by bringing charges against his superior—a former missionary, Rev. Richards‟ 
successor as royal translator and the King‟s most trusted advisor (Daws, 1968, p. 130). As for 
public perception, there is no better evidence that the kānaka maoli noticed a diversity or even 
conflict of interests among the haole than the results of the 1851 election, when seven of the 24 
newly elected representatives were haole, whereas haole made up about 2% of the population. 
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Evidently, many kanaka maoli electors must have voted for them, even against kanaka maoli 
candidates. Osorio (1996) concludes that “perhaps there were some Native voters in 1851 who 
hoped that a House that included rival haole might keep the more opportunistic ones from 
becoming more potent political forces within the government” (p. 141). Factional enmity among 
the haole was also a factor in the defeat of the 1852 judge qualification bill. Representative J. 
Marshall, objecting to it, set up a fictitious dilemma of choosing between a candidate “qualified 
by his education and legal knowledge” but requiring an interpreter, vs. a candidate with 
knowledge of the language but “dubious” character and “middling” ability (Weekly Argus, 1852, 
May 12
th
). No figure could better summarize the power struggle between upwardly haole laymen 
and the bilingual missionary advisers that controlled the King‟s Cabinet, or the increasing kanaka 
maoli distrust over the latter. It is also noteworthy how the Upper House, in turning down the 
bill, took up Marshall‟s cue and implied that “good character and knowledge of the language” 
weren‟t to be found together in the same people as often as desirable. 
Notwithstanding the above, the configuration of political forces at the time wasn‟t the only 
factor contributing to an inconspicuous sanctioning of linguicism. Just as important was the way 
of discussing language itself, which we can better analyze by looking at the similarities between 
Metcalf v. Kahai and Haalelea v. Montgomery. In both cases, the entire Court sat en banc; in both 
cases the Court favored the kanaka maoli against the haole party; in both cases the decision was 
penned and delivered by Robertson, who as a Representative in 1852 declared to sympathize 
with kanaka maoli language rights; in both cases the strict letter of statutes took precedence over 
customary rights. However, in the first case primacy was given to Hawaiian and in the latter to 
English. We must realize that at first the discursive undermining of Hawaiian language took the 
appearance of a technical aside bearing only indirect connection with the issues at hand. 
Linguicism found its way into policy by treating languages and their qualities in abstract, as 
disembodied codes, and disconnecting them from their speakers. In all suits it wasn‟t kānaka 
maoli who demanded preferential treatment for their language—instead, the haole parties stuck 
to the Hawaiian reading whenever it happened to benefit them in one way or another, either 
against kānaka maoli or, like in Hardy v. Ruggles et al, against other haole. In this particular 
case, the question on language presented itself completely dissociated from kanaka maoli 
interests; in fact, Rev. Andrews‟ testimony could be construed so narrowly as to just backing two 
missionary children among the defendants, one of them his own son-in-law Asa G. Thurston, 
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under charges of bad faith against a haole mortgagee. In Metcalf v. Kahai the favored language 
was Hawaiian, but when Haalelea v. Montgomery evidenced that this tactic wouldn‟t shield 
kānaka maoli from haole rapaciousness either, the hierarchy of languages might have seemed 
trivial enough to be settled by alleged linguistic criteria and expert testimony. At least ʻĪʻī, and 
perhaps Lee and Robertson as well, may have been unconcerned or unsuspecting about the true 
scope of what they may have thought to be just technical choices and practical shortcuts. In fact, 
Robertson‟s ruling sounds harmlessly technocratic, because he held English “original” and 
governing only “so far then as purely legal phraseology, or words of technical import, are 
concerned” and “where such legal or technical language is used” (Haalelea v. Montgomery, p. 
69). It is no wonder then that seemingly nobody spotted ethnic partisanship. Also, in Hardy v. 
Ruggles et al, Judge Lee had qualified the primacy of Hawaiian with a reminder that “the 
English and Hawaiian may often be used to help and explain each other where the meaning is 
obscure, or the contradiction slight” (p. 463). Later on, the Civil Code included an entire chapter 
„Of the Construction of Laws‟ (§9-19) to deal with grammatical and semantic ambiguity, but 
ambiguity between languages wasn‟t considered there—perhaps because Judge Robertson and 
Rev. Richard Armstrong, completing the draft after Lee‟s death, preferred Robertson‟s more 
expedient method of privileging one language. Their approach was endorsed by the legislators 




Considering the technocratic authority held in language, economy, politics or law by Justice 
Robertson, Justice Lee, Rev. Andrews, Rev. Richards, and John Ricord, and if looking for a 
commonality in it, it is not far-fetched to equate it with the professional imperialism that 
Phillipson denounces in the contemporary industries of English Language Teaching, and more 
generally in international development aid—in both fields, First World „experts‟ or „advisors‟ 
exert a monopoly over the production and distribution of knowledge, wielding a disproportionate 
clout in regard to the real-life relevance of their foreign models in local contexts. In Phillipson‟s 
(2000) slightly truculent but eloquent words: 
Professional imperialism triumphs even where political and economic domination has been 
broken. […] The knowledge-capitalism of professional imperialism subjugates people more 
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imperceptibly than and as effectively as international finance and weaponry. (p. 91)  
The comparison is even more plausible if remembering the 1836 aliʻi memorial asking for 
teachers and the Kingdom‟s early dependence on foreign aid donors. Professional imperialism is 
an integral component of economic globalization, but as we see here it also foreshadowed 
globalization. Professional imperialism is also an international extension of phenomena 
occurring within First World societies too, whenever particular professional groups resort to 
claims based on esoteric specialist knowledge to influence policies in the wider public arena. 
Thus, in 19
th
 century Hawaiʻi, American lawyers imported foreign technologies of nation-
building and diplomacy that would eventually benefit them more than the Kingdom. A good 
portray of their power was made by the kanaka maoli historian and former representative Samuel 
Kamakau (1992), who recollected Ricord‟s arrival in the following terms with the perspective of 
25 years passed: 
A learned man had arrived with knowledge of the law, and the foreigners who were holding 
office in the government hastened to put him forward by saying how clever and learned he was 
and what good laws he would make for the Hawaiian people. The truth was, they were laws to 
change the old laws of the natives of the land and cause them to lick ti leaves like the dogs and 
gnaw bones thrown at the feet of strangers, while the strangers became their lords, and the hands 
and voices of strangers were raised over those of the native race. (p. 399)   
In sum, it might be concluded that professional imperialism is the main form of cultural 
hegemony and precedes the constitution of both economic and linguistic disparities but, since it 
doesn‟t require language penetration, it is not cultural hegemony as LI defined it. On the other 
hand, professional imperialism is not the ultimate source of power either. Kamakau makes it very 
clear whose idea was to give Ricord the reins of the Kingdom. The Anglo-style legal system set 
up by Ricord and Lee was a necessary evil to fend off the military threats of the West, by 
investing the Kingdom with authority to settle its disputes with foreigners (Silverman, 1982). 
Indeed, the alleged pretext for British captain Paulet to temporarily seize the Kingdom in 1843 
was a legal suit over a land lot in Honolulu by British consul Richard Charlton, who recused 
local courts. This example might give the impression that any power is ultimately rooted in 
violence, but other evidence intimates that the opposite may happen as well: for instance, when 
in 1849 French admiral de Tromelin attempted to scare the Kingdom into submission just like 
Paulet did, the unarmed Hawaiian government successfully stood firm instead of giving in. The 
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same strength against psychological warfare was demonstrated in 1854, while U.S. high 
commissioner David Gregg tried to negotiate an annexation treaty amid rumors of impending 
filibustering from California. Then, even coercion by the threat of force may have the nature of a 
mind game too, and be considered a form of cultural hegemony. Kawamoto (1993) similarly 
pointed at hegemony when quoting U.S. President Grover Cleveland‟s words that the overthrow 
of Queen Liliʻuokalani was accomplished “without the drawing of a sword or the firing of a 
shot” (p. 200). From this perspective, sometimes imperialism may be indeed, as Mao Zedong put 
it, a paper tiger, and it would be possible to find other similar cases of military occupation by 
virtue of persuasion. Thus, by quoting a Marxist statesman, we may realize how far we have 
actually moved from a theory of power founded solely on a material base. The elusive nature of 
power is then not a particular flaw of LI, but something that every social theory has to come to 
grips with. Moreover, if we adopt a Foucauldian viewpoint and conclude that power/knowledge 
endlessly circulates throughout society rather than being monopolized by the few, then 
identifying a historical origin for it doesn‟t provide a key to neutralize it—what really matters is 
finding the way to short-circuit its flow by turning it against itself, so that historical research 
becomes most relevant to the extent that it may contribute to that purpose. 
 
PROFESSIONAL IMPERIALISM AND LANGUAGE 
 
 After identifying the main power structure rifting Hawaiian society before the Māhele, we 
may finally look at how English language primacy turned it into a social and ethnic divide. 
Osorio speculated that expertise in the law was the main consideration taken by voters in 1851 to 
elect their representatives, either kanaka maoli or haole. He also suggested that many legislators 
may have acquired that expertise as tax officers, a Native type of officers that the 1840 
Constitution made “judges in all cases arising from the tax law” (Blue Book, p. 18). Tax officers 
combined the executive task of gathering taxes and the judicial task of trying cases between 
konohiki and hoaʻāina, until in 1851 the latter function was transferred to ordinary courts (Sess. 
Laws 1851, p. 93). What he doesn‟t mention is that haole representatives cannot be assumed to 
have any such experience because, as mentioned before, in 1851 there were only two people in 
the Kingdom with a foreign law degree, and no local accrediting institution existed. If any haole 
acted as counsel in court, that must have been on account of their personal repute among other 
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haole; Representative Dr. Thomas C. B. Rooke, for instance, is mentioned as practicing law by 
1844 (Osorio, 1996, p. 481), although he actually was a physician by training. Did the 
representatives themselves acknowledge that lack of qualifications? A look back to the 1852 
judge qualification debate reveals that in the Lower House most haole and kanaka maoli 
representatives agreed in giving more weight to language skills because law training wasn‟t 
really the issue. Their approach framed the problem as a question on individual rights. In turn, 
the Upper House‟s reply, although apparently using the same terms, actually encoded a raison 
d’État of appropriating foreign knowledge and dislodging missionaries from their monopoly 
over it.   
Unwillingness to set language prerequisites would have immediate structural consequences, 
the first being an implicit endorsement of linguicism. This linguicism wasn‟t based on ideologies 
and arguments for English, which as we saw would come to the fore later in Hardy v. Ruggles et 
al. and Haalelea v. Montgomery, but on practices that privileged English-speaking judges over 
Hawaiian-speaking plaintiffs and defendants, sending an unambiguous message to the masses. 
Kauai constituents had requested their Representative Francis Funk to introduce the bill after 
having troubles with a monolingual haole judge. When the House of Nobles rejected it, in the 
popular mind English monolingualism probably turned from a handicap into sufficient 
qualification in itself—after all, if the exalted aliʻi allowed people without any command of 
Hawaiian to try cases, it must be because they had more valuable merits. In spite of privileging 
national interest, however, with this deal the government wasn‟t getting the goods that the 
makaʻāinana would pay for so dearly, because in actuality very few haole had the formal 
knowledge that they were selling. Instead, the ability to read and write English and teach oneself 
common law would substitute licenses and law degrees. Haole were assumed to know law 
without being requested to prove so by actually codifying and translating it in Hawaiian as 
Justice Lee did. In a sense, they weren‟t too different from current „native-speaker‟ globetrotters 
that, with a spotty language learning record and no educational qualifications, earn a living by 
teaching English with better salaries than local teachers. The comparison is pertinent because a 
similar market-value distortion was at play: given the scarcity of reliable interpreters, the 
presence of judges with little or no command of Hawaiian severely impaired kanaka maoli 
practitioners of law, either licensed or not, in competing with haole for clients; even in the 
relatively bilingual Supreme Court, it is revealing that the kanaka maoli plaintiffs in Haalelea v. 
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Montgomery and Oni v. Meek resorted to haole attorneys for an issue where the experience of a 
former tax officer would have been most relevant. When later on licensing practices were 
standardized, the entrenchment of common law and the necessity of being able to read British 
and American law reports made it unlikely for kānaka maoli to be licensed by the Supreme Court 
and admitted to the bar without a fairly advanced command of English. It can be said then that, 
rather than causing it, the definitive adoption of common law resulted from the hegemony of 
English, which substituted formal legal training and became the key for haole amateurs like 
Robertson to monopolize Hawaiʻi‟s judiciary system, before the second generation of haole 
settlers graduated from American law colleges. Thus, in Hawai„i linguistic imperialism consisted 
of the intersection between professional imperialism and linguicism, with the latter standing in 
for the former during a key decade in the history of the Kingdom. Writing about the 
constitutions, Osorio (1996) argues that for the haole, and especially Americans, American law 
provided “an ʻāina (land) of their own […], a place where all haole, whether they saw themselves 
as missionary or opportunist, could gather and claim the moral grounds of their presence in 
Hawai„i” (p. 146). If that was the case with statutory law, which was enacted bilingually, his 
remark is even truer for the judiciary power, where kanaka maoli were on their own in a foreign 
language and could be easily overwhelmed with a bewildering array of arcane precedents 
extracted from endless law reports.  
 
CONCLUSION: CULTURAL HEGEMONY REVISITED 
 
Although it is necessary to finish the study here, evidence in support for LI still looks quite 
ambiguous. It is incontrovertible that the linguicist privileging of English damaged kanaka maoli 
interests, but language hegemony still seems a byproduct or surrogate of other forms of 
dominance. Assuming a widespread use of English in the judiciary since 1850 would charge it to 
a bad strategic decision of accommodating to English monolinguals, which was caused in turn by 
local political alliances and a preexisting professional imperialism. On the other hand, giving 
more weight to Haalelea v. Montgomery and the Civil Code implies that linguicism was just a 
prejudiced ruse that haole exploited to sanction and seal an already emerging disparity of forces 
between them and kānaka maoli. The question about willful intent on the haole side that the 
previous words suggest is not completely foreign to LI; in fact, some reviewers have commented 
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that Phillipson subscribes to a conspiracy theory (Davies, 1996; Spolsky, 1995), because he 
seems engrossed in the search for responsibilities, something that he explicitly denied: “The 
conspiracy explanation […] ignores the structure within which the authors operate” (Phillipson, 
1992, p. 63). Suspicions of conspiracy may sound eccentric, yet shouldn‟t be dismissed out of 
hand. They accurately reflect the public perception and the political problems inherent to 
professional imperialism—the exclusive nature of the knowledge wielded by professional 
cliques, and their lack of public accountability. Additionally, the use of a foreign language, like 
English in 19
th
 century Hawaiian courts or in current ELT institutions, aggravates that exclusivity 
and turns it into secrecy—Supreme Court decisions were translated to Hawaiian with remarkable 
delay. Kamakau (1992), when reporting Keoni Ana‟s election to the governorship of Maui, 
singled out this conflict between the explicit rules of the democratic game and the pull of 
professional imperialism: “I was astonished, for I had believed that the ballot was really to 
determine an election according to the will of the greater number, but here the chiefs had given 
up their will to that of a single person” (p. 397). 
Then again, in either case, the central question of cultural hegemony as LI posits it remains 
unanswered—why adopting and learning English would harden the imbalance of power instead 
of shaking it? Solving this enigma requires a deep study of the educational policies and practices 
that spearheaded kanaka maoli reaction to the encroachment of haole and their language, which 
cannot be covered here. Nevertheless, this review of linguicism and the law hints at what to look 
for in the data. Rather than a general cultural influence, which as we saw long antedated English 
language spread, the court rulings analyzed above stress the importance of certain beliefs about 
language itself. In turn, the spread of those beliefs might be dependent on language spread or 
might not. Thus, without further data, the dubious case of Justice ʻĪʻī still may leave the door 
open to cultural hegemony. 
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 A disclaimer is pertinent here. I have no command of the Hawaiian language and all sources 
were originally in English, except for a few texts in published translations. This work is not thus 
the last word on the topic, but just a first look at it from the perspective of an outsider. In fact, 
most of this paper is not about the kānaka maoli nor claims to interpret their history for them. Far 
from such audacity, it focuses on the haole and their mind. I take here Pennycook‟s (1998) 
advice: “As a European, I must first seek out and question the colonizer within myself. [...] This 
is a question of not trying to read effects on others of processes I am trying to understand 
myself” (pp. 28-29). I am not actively seeking evidence of resistance to English in order to 
validate and sustain the current kanaka maoli struggle for self-determination—although that is a 
possible application of this research, kanaka maoli scholars are better prepared for that task. 
Instead, this paper tried to track down resistance to Hawaiian. In sum, I hope that Hawai„i people 
will excuse my mahaʻoi curiosity given what is at stake: a deeper understanding of that scourge 
of monolingualism that is threatening so many languages all over the world. 
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ruben_fernandez.asensio@yahoo.com. 
